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Abstract 
Transnational non-state governance arrangements (NGAs) are increasingly common in 
areas such as labour standards and environmental sustainability, often presenting 
themselves as innovative means through which the lives of marginalized communities in 
developing countries can be improved. Yet in some cases, the policy interventions adopted 
by the managers of these NGAs appear not to be welcomed by their supposed beneficiaries. 
This paper accounts for this predicament by examining the effects of different 
configurations of accountability within NGAs promoting labour rights. Most labour-rights 
NGAs incorporate “proxy accountability” arrangements, in which consumers and activists 
hold decision-makers accountable “on behalf” of the putative beneficiaries of the NGAs: 
workers and affected communities in poorer countries. The paper shows how and why 
different combinations of proxy versus beneficiary accountability influence the choice of 
policy instruments used by NGAs, and applies the argument to three prominent non-state 
initiatives in the domain of labour standards. 
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A prominent feature of global politics in recent years is the proliferation of advocacy 
campaigns, social certification schemes and other non-state governance initiatives that aim 
to mobilize publics in rich countries on behalf of disadvantaged groups in poor countries. 
Such initiatives sometimes lead to policy interventions that are not welcomed by their 
supposed beneficiaries.1 We investigate this phenomenon as it emerges in a particular 
context: the activities of non-state governance arrangements operating at transnational 
scales.  
We use the generic term “non-state governance arrangement” (NGA) to highlight two 
important areas of broad consensus in the literature: first, governance can in principle be 
provided without the involvement of state actors; second, coherent governance functions 
can be performed not only by single organizations, but also by separate organizations 
linked in networks or other cooperative “arrangements” (Koenig-Archibugi 2006). As 
documented in a number of studies,
2
 transnational NGAs are increasingly common in a 
range of policy domains. Some of them are aimed at producing benefits that are widely 
spread across the world’s population, for instance in relation to sustainable forestry and 
other environmental commons. By contrast, the policies of other NGAs are mainly directed 
towards specific groups of beneficiaries. This is often the case in the domain of labour 
standards, where a range of private schemes has emerged over the past twenty years to 
respond to consumer demand for “decent” working conditions in developing countries.  
To what extent are labour-standards NGAs affected by the problem of putative 
beneficiaries who object to what those NGAs do? In this paper, we examine three 
prominent NGAs – Fair Trade organizations, the Rugmark certification scheme, and the 
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Fair Labor Association – and show that an important background condition for the 
emergence of this problem can be found in all three. That is: there is no clear agreement 
among the typical members of different categories of stakeholders (mainly workers and 
their families, activists, and consumers) on the question of which policy instruments are 
most effective in achieving the NGAs’ professed goal of improving the lives of 
beneficiaries in poorer countries. Despite this common background condition, the NGAs 
under examination differ considerably in the extent to which beneficiaries approve of the 
policy instruments that are actually employed.  
In a nutshell, we argue that in the presence of disagreements between stakeholder groups 
over the choice of policy instruments, the mix of policy instruments employed by an NGA 
will be importantly influenced by the distinctive configuration of accountability 
relationships of that NGA. Our focus on the accountability of NGAs is somewhat unusual, 
since they are more commonly studied as mechanisms through which other actors – notably 
transnational companies or international organizations – can be held accountable for their 
social impacts. However, it is important to subject mechanisms of NGA accountability to 
systematic study, because they play a major role in determining whose policy instrument 
preferences are implemented and, ultimately, what NGAs are able to achieve. Not 
surprisingly, then, the accountability of NGAs themselves is coming under increased 
scrutiny from scholars concerned with the effectiveness and legitimacy of private 
governance in world politics.
3
  
We argue that a crucial dimension of variation in NGA accountability structures is based 
on a distinction between accountability arrangements in which policy makers are held 
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directly accountable to those most affected by their decisions (which we refer to as 
“beneficiary accountability”), and arrangements in which an actor exercises accountability 
on behalf of other actors and is not itself accountable to them. Following Rubenstein 
(2007), we may call such latter situations “surrogate accountability”, or “accountability by 
proxy”.   
In such cases of proxy accountability, activists and consumers in the global north see 
themselves as holding both companies and NGAs accountable “on behalf of” workers and 
affected communities, because the latter are not powerful enough to control the behaviour 
of those companies themselves. Acting in this role, consumers provide or withdraw support 
depending on whether they believe that the NGA lives up to particular standards in relation 
to the most directly affected groups. Likewise, labour rights and human rights activists of 
various kinds may also wield significant influence, again claiming to speak on behalf of the 
NGA’s “beneficiaries”.4  
We show that different patterns of influence generated as a result of proxy as opposed to 
beneficiary accountability mechanisms “matter”, because they influence which policy 
instruments get chosen by NGA managers. Specifically, we focus on choices between what 
we elaborate below as “allocative” versus “regulative” instruments, as well as major 
variants therein.   
The mix of policy instruments used by an NGA is not caused by any single factor, but is 
the result of complex configurations of conditions, of which the balance between proxy and 
beneficiary accountability is only one. With reference to governmental actors, Linder and 
Peters (1989) group the causes of variation in choice of policy instruments in four classes: 
  5 
systemic variables, organizational variables, problem-specific variables and individual-
level variables. All four types of variables, combined in various ways, contribute to 
explaining instrument choice not only in governments but also in NGAs. In this paper we 
aim the spotlight on the difference made by organizational variables, and specifically 
accountability mechanisms. We do this by discussing three cases where systemic, problem-
specific and individual-level conditions are broadly similar (although by no means 
identical): Rugmark, the Fair Trade system and the Fair Labor Association (FLA).  
The systemic context for all three cases includes the absence of strong national and 
international public institutions for regulating working conditions in developing countries. 
It also includes the emergence of a social norm, which advocacy networks have promoted 
with increasing success from the late 1980s, according to which the consumers of goods are 
somehow responsible for preventing the exploitation of the workers and communities that 
produce those goods, regardless of whether they are citizens of the same state or not 
(Segerlund 2010). Problem-specific conditions are also similar, as the three NGAs 
examined address the regulation of working conditions in global supply chains where 
consumers and producers are connected not through a single company but through a 
plurality of entities linked by more or less flexible and volatile contractual arrangements 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). While individual-level variables are more difficult to 
measure, we can identify at least one important similarity across our cases: managers with a 
primary background in activism interact with managers with a primary background in 
business to produce hybrid normative and cognitive orientations that socialize individuals 
into balancing commercial and social logics. 
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In what follows, we first develop a theoretical account of the mechanisms through which 
accountability structures affect instrument choices (section 1)  and then apply that account 
to the three NGAs (Section 2). Analysis of the Rugmark certification program draws on 
interviews and focus groups with 60 parents in carpet-producing villages in the Indian 
carpet belt, and interviews with 59 Rugmark staff, government officials, staff of 
international organizations and NGOs, teachers and carpet exporters, all with direct 
involvement in child labour policies relating to India. Analysis of Fair Trade draws on 
interviews and focus groups with 204 individuals from 58 producer, corporate and non-
profit organizations involved with the fair trade coffee sector in Central America (mainly 
Nicaragua), the United States and the UK. Analysis of the Fair Labor Association draws on 
around 70 interviews conducted in Guatemala and Washington DC, involving workers, 
companies, NGOs and FLA staff and Board members. Interview material was 
supplemented with other primary and secondary sources. 
 
1. From Accountability to Instrument Choice: Unravelling the Causal Mechanisms  
 
In this section, we clarify our conceptualization of the “dependent variable”: types of 
policy instruments (section 1.1). Then we present the building blocks of our explanation of 
policy instrument choice. First, we define the different categories of proxies who participate 
in the “proxy accountability arrangements” in which we are interested: specifically 
“distant” proxies and “solidaristic” proxies (section 1.2). Second, we explain how different 
accountability structures influence the weight that the views of those three groups have in 
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guiding the managers’ choices of instrument (section 1.3). Third, we address the question 
of preference discrepancy between typical beneficiaries, typical distant proxies and typical 
solidaristic proxies (section 1.4).  
 
1.1 Types of Policy Instruments 
Both state and non-state governance arrangements usually employ a mix of policies to 
pursue their economic, social or environmental objectives. The public policy literature has 
identified a wide range of policy instruments: for instance, a 1964 study on Economic 
Policy in Our Time listed 63 different economic policy instruments, such as subsidies to 
enterprises, taxes on property, government guarantees on loans, devaluations, and price 
controls (Kirschen et al. 1964). Various general typologies have been proposed,  but a 
substantial number of scholars have converged in grouping instruments into three large 
families, called respectively regulatory, financial and informational (de Bruijn and Hufen 
1998), or regulations (“sticks”), economic means (“carrots”) and information/exhortation 
(“sermons”) (Vedung 1998). In this paper, we focus on the first two families, which we will 
refer to as “regulative” and “allocative” respectively.  To be sure, they do not exhaust the 
range of instruments used by policy makers, but between them they encompass a large 
portion of the activities of the NGAs considered in this paper.  
We define regulative instruments as those aimed at restricting the range of possible 
courses of action available to those being regulated by attaching sanctions to some courses 
of action. By contrast, allocative instruments aim to expand the range of possible courses of 
action by providing resources (broadly defined) that can be employed for a range of 
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purposes. Regulative instruments thus include the formulation of rules that prescribe or 
proscribe certain courses of action, as well as the monitoring of compliance with those 
rules, certification of compliance to interested parties, adjudication of disputes, and 
application of sanctions in cases of non-compliance.  
Allocative instruments can take a variety of forms, depending amongst other things on 
what kind of resources are provided: money, credit, insurance, schooling, technical and 
professional training, organizational skill transfer, and health care are the most relevant 
resources in the context of the governance initiatives addressed in this paper. Narrowly 
defined, an NGA uses an allocative instrument when it collects resources and channels 
them to beneficiaries. We call this “direct allocation” in order to distinguish it from 
situations in which an NGA requires its members/affiliates to transfer resources to 
beneficiaries. We will refer to such requirements as “indirect allocation”, even though they 
are usually framed in regulative terms.  
 
1.2. Types of Proxies 
One important difference between categories of proxies is the extent to which they are 
detached or engaged from the life experiences of beneficiaries. While a minimum level of 
engagement is in any case necessary to be a proxy, some proxies invest considerable time 
and energy to learn about how beneficiaries perceive their own situation and to establish 
solidaristic linkages with them. Another distinguishing feature concerns the organization of 
proxies and whether any mechanism for collective action is available to them. On the one 
hand, some proxies exercise accountability in an atomistic way, typically by making on-
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the-spot purchasing decisions on the basis of dispersed information gathered from the 
media or other sources (including labels). On the other hand, other proxies are organized 
and “represented” by formal organizations or structured networks of activists, which act as 
conduits of information and negotiation. Engagement and organization are logically distinct 
features of proxies, but in practice they are often associated: engaged proxies are more 
likely to create the conditions for organized collective action, which in turn promotes 
engagement. In the cases we examine here, proxies tend to cluster in two groups: organized 
and engaged (which for simplicity we refer to as “solidaristic” proxies), and atomistic and 
detached (which we refer to as “distant” proxies). 
 
1.3 Accountability Structures and Managers’ Choice of Instruments  
Virtually all NGAs in the labour standard area are dependent on consumer support for 
their continuing existence. But they differ in the extent to which this kind of market 
accountability is complemented by accountability directly to beneficiaries. In other words, 
the empirically most important distinction is between “pure” proxy accountability systems 
and “hybrid” systems combining proxy and beneficiary accountability.  
How then do these different accountability structures influence the policy instrument 
choices made by NGA managers? The influence of distant proxies operates mostly through 
market mechanisms: consumers may refrain from buying products certified by the NGA or 
made by companies certified by the NGA, which in turn may endanger the financial 
viability of the NGA itself. Just as consumers use information provided by NGAs to hold 
companies accountable, consumers can use information provided by various sources (the 
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media, activist groups, etc) to hold NGAs accountable. To be sure, informational 
asymmetries make the “market for labour standards” (Elliot and Freeman 2003) highly 
imperfect, but nevertheless NGA managers are almost always anxious to gain and retain 
consumer confidence as well as visibility for their “brands”. This is especially the case to 
the extent that labour-standard NGAs are in a competitive relationship with one another 
(Fransen 2011). By contrast, the sources of influence used by solidaristic proxies and 
beneficiaries are more varied, and include non-financial forms of sanctioning.  
Although these institutional variables relating to information flows and sanctioning 
capacity are necessary conditions for accountability structures to influence policy 
instrument choices, they are not sufficient conditions. Such influence will also depend on 
the responsiveness of policy-makers to input from stakeholders, which, depending on the 
context, may mean to be motivationally sensitive to the consequences of losing reputation 
or office, cognitively able to engage in the learning and deliberation demanded by 
communicative forms of accountability, and other personal and interpersonal conditions. 
 
1.4 Different Preferences Concerning Policy Instruments 
If the preferences of (distant and solidaristic) proxies with regard to instrument choice were 
always fully aligned with the preferences of beneficiaries, the presence or absence of 
beneficiary accountability mechanisms alongside proxy accountability mechanisms would 
make no difference in terms of the policy instruments that are actually chosen. However, 
the policy instruments preferred by typical beneficiaries are at least sometimes different 
from those preferred by typical distant proxies and those preferred by typical solidaristic 
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proxies. Specifically, our cases suggest that (1) typical beneficiaries and solidaristic proxies 
tend to support more complex combinations of instruments, while typical distant proxies 
are satisfied by more simple instruments; (2) the policy mix preferred by typical 
beneficiaries, and some solidaristic proxies, is more oriented towards allocation and less 
toward regulation than the mix that appeals to typical distant proxies.  
It would exceed the scope of this paper to explain when and why we should observe 
such differences, but there are reasons to believe that they are not simply a contingent 
feature of our cases but a more general and systematic phenomenon – we mention these 
here as promising directions for research.  
One reason why distant proxies may be more supportive of regulative instruments than 
beneficiaries is because they may privilege negative duties over positive duties.
5
 That is, 
they may believe that economic relationships linking consumers and businesses to 
producers in other countries generate negative duties (not to harm other people) but not 
positive duties (to assist them, or provide them with goods). For instance, some consumers 
may want to avoid any personal implication in child labour (supporting regulative 
instruments to try and achieve this) but at the same time accept no personal responsibility 
for providing the resources necessary to improve children’s welfare, therefore de-
prioritizing allocative instruments.  
Another reason why distant proxies may look favourably to regulative instruments is 
that they may consider them a more cost-effective way to improve the welfare of workers 
and communities.
6
 Regardless of whether available evidence supports such a belief, this 
explanation ultimately hinges on what instruments different stakeholders believe are 
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“effective” or not.  
This leads us to a further explanation, which emphasises different understandings of 
causality and associated perceptions of fit between problems and solutions. Problems such 
as child labour, poor working conditions, or salaries at or below subsistence levels, can be 
explained either by placing greater stress on the role of personal dispositions (greedy 
employers, corrupt labour inspectors, selfish, myopic or gullible parents, etc) or by 
emphasizing situational constraints (poverty, low productivity, lack of education 
opportunities, etc). Social psychologists call the former type of explanation “dispositional” 
and the latter “situational”. A dispositional explanation assumes that the context presents 
actors with a range of options and that they make the “wrong” choice. If choice is seen as 
the problem, then the most appropriate solution is likely to be restriction of the range of 
possible courses of action by employing a regulative instrument. On the other hand, a 
situational explanation assumes that the context leaves certain actors with limited choice. If 
constraints are seen as the problem, the most appropriate solution is likely to be expansion 
of the range of possible courses of action by providing relevant resources – in other words, 
by employing an allocative instrument.  
Social psychologists have found that dispositional explanation is the “default” mode and 
tends to dominate social inferences when individuals are either unable or unwilling to 
devote sufficient resources (attention, time, energy, etc.) to pursue situational corrections 
(Gilbert 1989). It can be conjectured that, since consumers are less able and/or willing to 
make such an effort, they are less likely to perform situational adjustments than 
beneficiaries, and thus more likely to favour regulatory instruments. Solidaristic proxies, on 
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the other hand, differ from typical consumers in that they have a stronger motivation 
(because of their engagement) as well as better opportunities (because of their organization) 
to invest time and attention in analyzing the problem, and therefore are more likely to 
perform situational adjustments and support allocative instruments.  
 
2. Accountability and Instrument Choice in Three Labour-standards NGAs 
 
In this section we illustrate how the causal processes outlined above have played out across 
three NGAs addressing labour conditions in export sectors of developing countries. These 
cases display significant variation both with regard to their mix of policy instruments and 
with regard to their accountability structures: we show how the former are affected by the 
latter. 
2.1 Rugmark 
Rugmark is a non-state market-based certification mechanism, which focuses on the 
labelling of carpets and is supported by a governance structure that spans developing and 
developed countries. It consists of distinct organizations that work under a common 
umbrella, Rugmark International. Until the recent and on-going re-structuring, three 
member organizations were located in carpet exporting countries – India, Nepal and 
Pakistan – and three were located in importing countries – Germany, USA and United 
Kingdom. The following discussion focuses on operations in India, where Rugmark 
activities started, over the 1995-2005 period. 
Rugmark Instruments. Rugmark uses both regulative and allocative instruments. The 
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regulative dimension includes the creation as well as the enforcement of rules. Rugmark 
rules consist of substantive rules concerning the use of child labour in carpet production 
and procedural rules concerning registration, inspection and deregistration in case of non-
compliance. Applicants for a license to use the Rugmark label undertake a commitment that 
carpets bearing the label have been manufactured without the involvement of children 
under 14 years of age, as mandated by Indian legislation. Work by children belonging to 
the loom owners’ family is permitted under the condition that they attend school regularly. 
Licensees are also obliged to pay at least the official minimum wages to the loom-owners. 
Compliance with Rugmark rules is monitored by an inspection team and, if inspectors 
repeatedly find illegal child labour in looms, the delinquent exporters lose the permission to 
use of the label.  
Rugmark India’s allocative dimension involves the running of a centre for the 
rehabilitation of former bonded child labourers and six non-residential primary schools for 
children in carpet weaving areas. Rugmark provides no compensation to families for the 
loss of income from child work and no alternative income opportunities (except some 
training for women in carpet weaving). In the 1997-2002 period, Rugmark India spent 
about half of its license fee income on administration and monitoring and the other half for 
social programs (Dietz 2003: 64), but the identity of Rugmark is still much more linked to 
its regulative than its allocative functions. 
Stakeholder Preferences Concerning Policy Instruments. We consider the preferences of 
three groups of stakeholders: the beneficiaries of Rugmark activities, specifically the 
parents of children likely to work in carpet manufacturing; consumers (i.e. prospective 
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buyers of carpets made in the areas covered by Rugmark), who may act as distant proxies; 
and the NGOs that supported the creation and later operation of Rugmark, who we classify 
as solidaristic proxies. Undoubtedly there are major differences of opinion within the three 
groups. But what concerns us here is whether there is any evidence of a systematic 
difference between what could be considered the typical preferences of parents, of 
consumers, and of supporting NGOs. Interviews conducted by one of this paper’s authors 
with parents of (former) child labourers in areas with the highest concentration of 
Rugmark-certified looms provided a relatively unambiguous picture of what they desired 
from initiatives aimed at reducing child labour.
7
 On the one hand, they desired schools with 
no teacher absenteeism and no discrimination on grounds of poverty and caste, as well as 
the provision of food, clothes, shoes and books to children attending schools, without the 
need to pay fees. On the other hand, they desired better employment opportunities for 
adults and financial help for the purchase of farming animals. These responses coincide 
with the findings of a research team from the Institute for Human Development, which 
collected information on a sample of 5545 workers in Rugmark-registered looms, looms 
registered in other labelling schemes, and unregistered looms (19.21 per cent were child 
workers). The research team found that for the villagers an improvement of school 
attendance depended on the establishment of schools at an accessible distance, regular 
teacher attendance, improved teacher-pupil ratios and the provision of mid-day meals 
(Sharma et al. 2000, 66). Financial and indirect costs of schooling were also shown to play 
an important role in the choices of parents. “They opined that sending their children to 
school meant a double liability for them - foregoing income from weaving or the labour 
input of the child on the one hand and direct costs incurred on schooling on the other. […] 
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The parents in the sample villages were of the opinion that their family income cannot 
sustain schooling for a long time and hence, their children are required to work with them 
either as a full time or as a part time worker” (Sharma et al. 2000, 66). Parents of (former) 
child workers thus express a clear preference for allocative instruments, specifically those 
that improve the proximity, affordability and quality of schooling, and provide forms of 
income replacement. They also support some regulative measures, specifically disciplinary 
interventions to improve teacher performance, but this does not seem to be their main 
concern.  
By contrast, they often express scepticism or opposition to regulative measures such as 
prohibition and monitoring of child labour. In the focus groups conducted by the IHR team 
with parents in villages with labelled looms, they “complained of restrictions on preventing 
children from working. According to them, interventions without taking care of their woes 
and means of livelihood did not offer a sustainable solution, and children would continue to 
work either openly or covertly” (Sharma et al. 2000, 67). Similarly, a team surveying 623 
households with children working in the carpet industry and 319 households without 
children working in the carpet industry, spread in 27 villages in Uttar Pradesh, found that 
“NGOs working with government agencies for better enforcement are not well regarded by 
the villagers” (Srivastava and Raj 2002: 111). 
Does this differ from consumer preferences, especially those that are revealed in on-the-
spot purchasing decisions? We are not aware of surveys or experiments that directly 
capture relative preferences for different types of instruments; hence we have to rely on 
more indirect evidence. Evidence from two experimental studies – one in the laboratory and 
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one in the field - is informative. Rode et al. (2008) conducted an experiment (in Spain) with 
162 students who acted as price-setting producers and consumers, with producers being 
described as international firms with production facilities in regions where child labour was 
prevalent. Consumers were told that only one in three producers complied with the 
conditions of an internationally recognized NGO fighting child labour, and provided with 
details of Rugmark’s activities and the conditions necessary for the use of its label. In 
repeated market interactions among the experimental subjects, the certified producer 
attained an overall market share of 26 percent, despite the fact that its prices were usually 
higher than those posted by the non-certified producers. Evidence from a field experiment 
points to similar conclusions (Kimeldorf et al. 2006). These findings provide indirect 
evidence that, when consumers are exposed to information about Rugmark’s approach to 
child labour, a substantial proportion of them support it. Of course, this conclusion would 
be on more solid ground if experimental subjects had been given the choice between 
supporting different combinations of regulative and allocative measures. It is possible that 
some of them may have regarded the current Rugmark mix as flawed, yet “better than 
nothing.” But the available evidence indicates that consumers assess regulative measures 
more positively than parents of actual or potential child labourers and want to support 
initiatives that spend at least part of the price premium on activities such as the inspection 
of production sites. 
We now consider the position of what we regard as solidaristic proxies, i.e. the NGOs 
that supported the creation of Rugmark in the early 1990s and have continued to support its 
operations in subsequent years. In Germany, the most prominent organizations are Misereor 
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(the development aid charity of Germany’s Catholic bishops); Brot für die Welt (a 
development aid charity supported by Germany’s protestant churches); terre des hommes; 
and UNICEF Germany (a private-law charity). In the US, Rugmark was supported by 
International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and the Child Labor Coalition (an NGO network 
coordinated by the National Consumers League). In the UK, Rugmark was supported by 
Anti-Slavery International.
 
On the whole, they supported the regulative focus of Rugmark 
while the initiative was being discussed and designed between 1991 and 1994, and they 
have continued to support this focus in the past sixteen years. They have also promoted 
Rugmark’s allocative interventions alongside the inspection and certification system.  
Accountability Structures. The preceding discussion has shown that Rugmark’s policy 
mix does not coincide with the preference of beneficiaries, while it is supported by distant 
and solidaristic proxies. This outcome is largely a result of the accountability structures of 
Rugmark. As pointed out by a Rugmark manager, “the whole idea of Rugmark is to have 
the market dictate the terms” (author interview). As with other forms of accountability, 
market accountability combines the provision of information by decision-makers to 
accountability holders and the possibility that the latter will impose sanctions on the former.  
A key function of the Rugmark system is to supply information to consumers about the 
conditions under which a particular carpet has been produced. Rugmark’s effort to reach 
out to consumers in Western countries corresponds to their ability to “sanction” Rugmark 
by refraining from purchasing Rugmark-labelled carpets. Importers play a crucial role in 
mediating between consumers – as potential distant proxies – and Rugmark as an 
organization. Importers weigh the costs and benefits of Rugmark membership according to 
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economic and perhaps other criteria. In making their decision to join or leave Rugmark, 
importers consider both the extent to which their prospective customers (and intermediate 
retailers) are likely to value a child-labour certification and the credibility of the 
certification itself. In principle exporters in producing countries may join or leave Rugmark 
independently from requests by importers, but in practice exporters will do as important 
importers expect them to. Rugmark organizations critically depend on the fees paid by 
importers and exporters for the use of the label.  
Rugmark depends financially not only on consumers as “distant proxies”, but also on 
supporting charities as “solidaristic proxies”. In principle those external organizations can 
impose sanctions on Rugmark by withdrawing sponsorship and support, or by publicly 
criticizing Rugmark. Given their record of support for Rugmark, any such criticism would 
be particularly damaging. Rugmark Germany is not financially self-sustaining but depends 
on financial support from the German government through the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), as well as other agencies and charities (Dietz 2003). 
Similarly, the Rugmark Foundation U.S.A, which promotes and protects the Rugmark 
trademark in the US market, depends importantly on grants and gifts.  
The provision of information to direct and solidaristic proxies and the ability of the latter 
to sanction Rugmark managers stand in stark contrast to the minimal or non-existent role of 
the primary stakeholders, i.e. the children and their families, in the accountability structures 
of Rugmark. There is no evidence of a sustained program of information sharing to explain 
Rugmark’s aims to carpet weavers.  The IHD survey team, which targeted villages with a 
high concentration of Rugmark looms, found that “villagers had little or no idea of the 
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labelling program initiated for tackling the problem of child labour in the carpet industry. 
Even the adult weavers on label-registered looms viewed these as another set of Labour 
Department inspections. Also, most villagers expressed complete ignorance about the 
welfare activities of the labelling programmes” (Sharma et al. et al. 2000, 49). Similarly, a 
German evaluation team found that Rugmark India “almost exclusively partner with their 
business groups (exporters/manufacturers registered with them). There is little or no 
partnership with the civil society or the target groups, children and their communities, in 
the institutional setting and planning of [the organization…] Rugmark India never 
attempted to develop partnerships with civil society groups, local government bodies… nor 
with their beneficiaries” (Dietz 2003: 60). Researchers working in the carpet belt have 
noted that the families of working children tend to see the inspectors as outside forces 
encroaching on their means of livelihood, rather than an organization that owes them 
accountability.   
In conclusion, Rugmark is characterized by the following constellation: there is a 
divergence between the typical beneficiaries, who have a clear preference for allocative 
instruments, and the typical distant proxies, who tend to support a regulative certification 
that no child labour has been used in the production of goods. Rugmark organizations are 
financially dependent on solidaristic proxies and especially distant proxies, and virtually all 
information flows are directed towards those groups. In Rugmark’s accountability structure, 
beneficiaries play no role – neither as participants in two-way flows of communication and 
deliberation nor as actors capable of sanctioning decision-makers. The result of this 
constellation is a significant disconnect between the instrument mix typically preferred by 
  21 
beneficiaries and the mix chosen by Rugmark managers. 
 
2.2  Fair Trade 
We next consider the fair trade system, focusing primarily on the certified system organized 
within the Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO). The FLO was created in 1997 by 
“national initiatives” based in consumer countries. Each national initiative continues to 
control licensing of the Fairtrade mark within their country (Nicholls and Opal 2005).  
Fair Trade Instruments. The mix of instruments used within the fair trade system has 
evolved significantly as the system has developed. Prior to the establishment of 
certification standards, the fair trade system operated primarily as an allocative system, in 
which the strategic emphasis was on enabling resource transfers, capacity building and 
broader processes of social development. Regulative functions, to the extent they were 
carried out, tended to be coordinated more informally via solidaristic networks of fair trade 
activists engaged primarily in performing allocative functions. Formal certification systems 
were only later created by “National Initiatives” – alternative trading organizations 
operating within consuming countries in North America and Europe – who then formed an 
overarching international body, the Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO). Increasing 
volumes of fair trade coffee are now traded within the framework of this formal 
certification system, though more informal networks of fair trading continue.  
Regulative instruments now play an important role within the FLO system, taking the 
form of standard-setting, auditing and certification functions. Within the FLO system’s 
overarching governance strategy, the role of these regulative instruments can best be 
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understood as means of enabling fair trade managers to exercise indirect control over 
decision making processes further down the supply chain, by specifying and then 
monitoring standards. The content of the standards then becomes in effect the steering 
mechanism through which this indirect control is exercised as a basis for performing 
regulative and/or allocative functions. Standards may then be defined in a way that will 
enable them to operate as instruments of direct regulative control (designed to constrain the 
choices of the direct subject of the regulation), or as instruments of indirect allocative 
control (requiring the direct subject of the regulation to engage in allocative activities that 
will in turn expand the choices of a third set of actors – the real targets of the governance 
instrument).  
Fairtrade standards are multi-dimensional, and in practice are used in both these ways, 
encompassing requirements designed to operate both as direct regulative instruments, and 
indirect allocative instruments.
 
Standards that operate as direct regulative instruments 
include producer standards concerning working conditions, child labour and the 
environment. Indirect allocative instruments include those trading standards requiring 
provision of a “fair” minimum price and social premium, provision of pre-financing if 
requested by the producer group and a commitment to long-term trading relationships, and 
producer standards requiring the democratic governance of producer organizations. 
Although Fairtrade standards encompass both regulative and allocative dimensions, the 
latter play a greater strategic role in defining the purpose of the organization than is the 
case for Rugmark. This strategic emphasis is reflected in the framing through which the 
meaning of Fairtrade certification is both internally conceptualized and externally 
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represented. Moreover, the fair trade system encompasses a much broader range of 
allocative instruments than is the case in Rugmark – contributing not only to the allocation 
of financial and material resources (in the form of a “fair price” and social premium), but 
also more intangible resources in the form of enhanced knowledge and experience 
concerning production, trading, managerial and community organizing activities. These 
intangible resources are expected to be generated by, amongst other things, the requirement 
that Fairtrade products are purchased on a long term basis from democratically governed 
worker or producer organizations. Many “alternative trade organizations” within the fair 
trade system also provide direct training and learning programs for worker and producer 
organizations to further facilitate the transfer of intangible resources. 
Stakeholder Preferences Concerning Policy Instruments. Beneficiaries within the fair 
trade system encompass both workers and smallholder producers, the mix of which varies 
in relation to different certified products. Both in interviews conducted as part of this 
research and as documented in other research, worker and producer groups are typically 
strongly supportive of allocative instruments (Bacon 2005). They are also very much in 
favour of the use of regulative instruments as means of promoting indirect allocative 
functions that require fair trade buyers to comply with minimum price, pre-financing and 
long term purchasing obligations. Moreover, beneficiaries tend to recognize the value of a 
broad range of allocative instruments, including intangible and tangible forms of resource 
transfer. Because beneficiaries bear the cost of regulative functions rather directly in the 
form of certification fees, most have a preference for limiting the costliness of such 
processes. However, most seem to at least broadly concur with the view that the existence 
  24 
of a regulative process has some value as a means of strengthening the effectiveness of 
indirect allocative processes and assuring consumers that such functions have been 
effectively discharged.   
There are significant differences between preferences of beneficiaries and those of 
consumers, who operate as distant proxies within the fair trade system. Consumer surveys 
addressing issues of instrument choice, albeit usually indirectly, tend to support the idea 
that consumers can recognize the value of both regulatory and allocative mechanisms, 
usually with a small predisposition towards regulative mechanisms. For instance, in 2006 a 
random-sample national poll in the US found that the percentage of respondents who are 
willing to pay more for clothing made in “safe” working conditions (a typical regulative 
issue) is roughly 10 per cent higher than the percentage of respondents willing to accept a 
comparable price increase for “Fair-Trade” coffee that guarantees a “living wage” to 
producers in addition to “fair and safe” working conditions (Hertel et al. 2009). Particularly 
relevant for our argument are those surveys finding that “consumers are more willing to 
penalize firms for making products under poor conditions than to reward firms for making 
products made under good conditions” (Elliott and Freeman 2003: 46, cf. 33-35; see also 
Folkes and Kamins 1999). Companies therefore have a stronger incentive to invest 
resources in the inspection of production sites to minimize negative publicity than to charge 
higher prices and allocate resources to workers and their communities. 
The proposition that consumers more readily recognize the value of regulative 
instruments than allocative instruments is at least indirectly supported by evidence that 
consumers tend to give disproportionate weight to assessments of the system’s regulative 
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effectiveness in forming overall judgments about fair trade’s performance as a governance 
arrangement. There appears to be a general tendency for consumers to respond negatively 
to publicity that characterizes the fair trade system as failing in “policing” functions 
associated with the enforcement of regulatory standards (Wilson 2010). Direct evidence 
regarding the capacity of consumers to differentiate between allocative instruments on the 
basis of the particular resources they provide (and the contextual appropriateness of these) 
is scarce, though in interviews with one of the authors many fair trade managers reported 
recurring frustration in their efforts to develop “messaging” that might enable consumers to 
more readily differentiate the value of intangible allocative mechanisms provided through 
the fair trade system.  
The capacity to differentiate between these variants of allocative mechanisms appears 
much stronger in the case of solidaristic proxies, who also play an important role within the 
fair trade system. Solidaristic proxies are in this case a range of alternative trade 
organizations, church, student and community groups participating in the fair trade 
movement (Jaffee 2007; Smith and Barrientos 2005). In contrast to distant proxies, 
solidaristic proxies appear to have instrument preferences that are more closely aligned 
with those of beneficiaries, emphasising direct and indirect allocative mechanisms and 
distinguishing to a much greater extent between allocative mechanisms of different kinds.  
Accountability Structures. We have seen that the policy mix implemented by the Fair 
Trade system is significantly more aligned with beneficiary preferences than in the case of 
Rugmark. This greater alignment is due in part to the distinctive accountability 
relationships found in the FLO system. To the extent that the FLO system operates 
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essentially as a market-based model of social certification, consumers wield a significant 
degree of structural power within the fair trade system, as within Rugmark. Therefore, even 
though consumers do not have any formal role within the FLO governance structure, their 
influence over managerial decisions is significant. Furthermore, Fairtrade’s market-based 
accountability processes enable major corporate buyers of Fairtrade certified products to 
wield increasing influence over managerial decision making. In contrast to Rugmark, 
however, governance and accountability arrangements within FLO assign significant direct 
control to beneficiaries. Although the majority of positions on the FLO Board are still held 
by fair trade stakeholders from consuming rather than producing countries, representatives 
of Fairtrade certified producer organizations hold four out of 13 positions on the FLO 
Board. Moreover, producer organizations have some direct representation on FLO’s 
Standards Committee, the body to which FLO’s standard-setting functions are delegated. 
This formal representation of beneficiaries, and the concomitant ability to communicate 
directly with representatives of solidaristic proxies, was crucial in enabling producer 
representatives to strengthen the allocative dimension of the FLO system, notably by 
securing the increase of the minimum price for coffee and the social premium paid to 
producer groups against the initial opposition of some managers of Fair Trade organizations 
in consuming countries (Reinicke 2010).  
In conclusion, the FLO system of fair trade is characterized by a significant divergence 
between the instrument preferences of beneficiaries and those of consumers, with 
beneficiaries placing a stronger emphasis than consumers on allocative instruments, and 
demonstrating greater appreciation for allocative instruments involving “intangible” forms 
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of resource transfer. Like Rugmark, fair trade managers are importantly influenced by 
market based accountability structures that enable consumers to exercise structural power 
over managers. However in contrast to Rugmark, beneficiaries possess significant forms of 
direct control over managerial instrument choices via their direct representation on the FLO 
standard-setting committee and the FLO Board. Solidaristic proxies also play an important 
role in countering the influence of distant proxies, via their role in facilitating processes of 
learning through which managerial choices are, over time, able to be brought into closer 
alignment with beneficiary preferences.  
 
2.3 Fair Labor Association 
The Fair Labor Association (FLA) is a US-based voluntary governance arrangement in 
which a number of high profile apparel and sportswear companies work together with 
universities and NGOs to promote compliance with core international labour standards 
within their supply chains. The FLA was established in 1999 as a direct product of the 
‘anti-sweatshop’ campaigns that emerged in the US during the 1990s.  
FLA instruments. FLA managers rely predominantly on regulative instruments. 
Designated standards are codified within the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct, and these 
are supported by more informal guidelines relating to Code implementation. Monitoring of 
the Code within individual factories is then carried out in part by individual participating 
companies, and in part via external monitoring visits managed by FLA staff (who plan and 
schedule these visits, and accredit and hire external monitors). Formally, the FLA’s 
enforcement mechanism has the power to exclude non-compliant companies from the 
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Association, though in practice consequences of non-compliance also depend importantly 
on how a range of external actors (employees, consumers, shareholders, regulators, 
business partners, and so on) interpret and respond to the ‘de-legitimizing’ signal sent by 
such exclusion.   
In the FLA’s early years, such regulative instruments tended to operate in the absence of 
significant support from auxiliary allocative instruments. Over time, in response to the 
persistent failings of audit-based, ‘policing’ approaches, there has been some increase in the 
willingness of managers to combine regulative mechanisms with allocative instruments. 
One such change has involved increased emphasis by FLA managers on policies designed 
to expand the capacities of company managers to comply more reliably (and at lower cost) 
with designated regulative standards by combining technical assistance with support for 
processes of ideational influence and learning. In most cases, financial resource allocation 
remains limited, with most support offered in the form of technical assistance and advice. 
Allocative mechanisms involving the transfer of resources (material or intangible) to 
workers remain underdeveloped within the FLA. This is true both of freestanding (albeit 
indirect) allocative mechanisms in the form of regulative requirements for payment of 
living wages, and of auxiliary allocative mechanisms designed to support the effectiveness 
of regulative processes by enabling worker organizations more effectively to organize in 
the workplace, and/or participate in processes of monitoring and remediation. 
Stakeholder preferences concerning policy instruments. Consumers in the garment and 
sportswear sectors have repeatedly demonstrated a readiness to respond more strongly to 
governance problems framed with reference to corporate ‘abuse’ in far off ‘sweatshops’ 
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than to frames recognizing more complex causes of poor sweatshop conditions. 
Correspondingly, consumers have tended to expect the use of regulative instruments 
focused on regulating corporate conduct as means of addressing such problems.  
Factory workers in the facilities supplying FLA participating companies and licensees 
(the major beneficiaries in the FLA) are also generally in favour of regulatory mechanisms, 
at least to the extent that they are effective: ‘We would like the brands to … make the firms 
comply with the codes of conduct, because I can only presume that this is why they exist, 
not just so they can be tucked away doing nothing’ (author interview with one Guatemalan 
factory worker). However, in contrast to distant proxies, workers themselves tend to 
emphasise the need for regulative processes to be underpinned by allocative instruments 
that directly support worker organization and participation, both in monitoring and audit 
processes, and in workplace decision making more broadly. In explaining their reasons for 
supporting such instruments, workers often identify a range of complex contextual factors 
that undermine the effectiveness of simple regulative instruments – for example the power 
of business interests, the weakness or capture of labour ministries, a wider history and 
climate of union repression or weak rule of law. Such factors in turn underpin conditions 
such as a fear of civic organizing, a lack of confidence in state institutions and so on. 
Similarly, many workers identify complex situational factors as being primarily responsible 
for problems of underage workers in factories. According to one organization in 
Guatemala: ‘This problem of underage workers isn’t about decrees or laws, rather it is a 
political and structural economic problem. As long as this doesn’t improve, they will keep 
working … People have to survive’ (author interview).  Accordingly, and in contrast to 
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distant proxies who tend not to engage with the complexities of such situational constraints, 
workers tend to readily identify the value of underpinning regulative processes in allocative 
mechanisms that transfer resources to workers themselves, thereby helping to counter the 
severe social power asymmetries in which labour rights violations are so often embedded. 
Workers also commonly emphasize the importance of (indirect) allocative mechanisms in 
the form of living wages.  
In general, the instrument preferences of solidaristic proxies have been closely aligned 
with those of beneficiaries. In this case, the most important categories of solidaristic 
proxies are student groups that seek to influence the University members of the FLA, as 
well as a range of other groups in both the United States and many producing country 
locations involved in labour and human rights organizing and advocacy. Like workers, such 
solidaristic proxies have stressed the importance of allocative mechanisms such as payment 
of living wages and support for worker organizing.  
Accountability structures. Accountability arrangements once again play an important 
role in shaping managerial instrument choices, by helping to shape the distribution of 
influence over managerial decision making between these differing stakeholder groups. As 
in the previous two cases, the FLA embodies important elements of market-based 
accountability. The structural influence of consumers over managerial choices is exercised 
much more indirectly in this case than in the other two, being mediated through the 
preferences of corporate participants in the FLA. FLA managers tend to leave public 
communication strategies largely to the discretion of individual companies, who in turn 
focus their energies on directly engaging the activist groups who are perceived to pose the 
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greatest direct risk to corporate brands. Nevertheless, companies (and in turn FLA 
managers) remain importantly constrained by the recognition that if the FLA is to serve the 
political/market risk insurance function that they wish it to, companies must ultimately be 
able to justify the FLA’s chosen instrument mix in terms that consumers will accept. 
Like Rugmark, but in contrast to the fair trade system, beneficiaries are able to exercise 
very little direct control over managers. First, structures of beneficiary representation 
within the FLA are very weak. Moreover, beneficiaries have limited ability to sanction the 
FLA (and/or participating companies) for Code violations, or indeed for any of its other 
decisions that significantly affect them. The FLA’s accountability to workers is further 
constrained by the limited knowledge possessed by many regarding the substance of FLA 
decisions, the procedures through which these decisions are made, and in many cases the 
very existence and purpose of the Association.  
Rather than giving direct control to beneficiaries, control within the FLA’s formal 
governance structures is dominated by corporate and university members (and to a lesser 
extent, solidaristic proxies). The FLA Board, which is responsible for setting the 
Association’s strategic direction and overseeing its activities, is structured so that control is 
shared equally between companies, universities and NGOs. Under these conditions, the 
goal of seeking strengthened alignment between managerial instrument choices and 
preferences of beneficiaries has relied importantly on the involvement of solidaristic 
proxies. To some extent solidaristic proxies have been able to exert influence directly 
through the Board, either via individual NGO Board members, or via indirect leverage 
wielded by campus based student activists over University managers. More often, however, 
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the influence of solidaristic proxies has been exercised via their contributions to facilitating 
processes of feedback and learning among managers. There is some evidence that such 
learning processes involving solidaristic proxies played an important role in driving key 
elements of the FLA’s Charter reforms in 2001-2002 (Chung, 2004: 173). It is also likely 
that pressure from activists, including student groups, on companies and universities 
strengthened the bargaining power of those NGOs inside the organization negotiating 
directly with companies. As a result of the 2002 charter changes, some changes to auditing 
processes were introduced that helped strengthen regulative processes – most notably in the 
form of increased transparency surrounding audit processes. Nevertheless, the influence of 
solidaristic proxies has in many cases proved insufficient to shift managerial choices 
towards some of the more overtly allocative instruments that beneficiaries and solidaristic 
proxies had advocated. Of particular note, FLA managers continued to resist demands for 
‘living wages’ and for the FLA to carry out programmes to train workers.  
In conclusion, the FLA shares in common with the two governance arrangements 
examined above a significant divergence between the instrument preferences of 
beneficiaries and those of consumers: unlike beneficiaries, consumers tend to favour 
regulative mechanisms, and show little recognition of the distinctive value of instrument 
choices that combine regulative mechanisms with a range of supporting allocative 
mechanisms. As in the previous two cases, the FLA embodies important elements of 
market-based accountability, though the structural influence of consumers over managerial 
choices is exercised much more indirectly in this case, being mediated through the 
preferences of corporate participants in the FLA. Like Rugmark, but in contrast to the 
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Fairtrade system, beneficiaries have very little direct control over managers. Under these 
conditions, solidaristic proxies – whose instrument preferences appear well aligned with 
those of beneficiaries – have played an important role in challenging and somewhat 
countering the influence of both consumers and companies, in part via their indirect forms 
of leverage over members of the FLA Board, but also as a result of their contributions to 
facilitating processes of learning among NGA managers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that we have good cause for being 
concerned about the phenomenon of proxy accountability in global private governance 
arrangements – not only because of potential objections to such arrangements on 
democratic grounds, but also because of potential consequences for the propensity of 
different governance arrangements to live up to the hopes and expectations of intended 
beneficiaries.  
In addition to demonstrating in general terms that proxy accountability relationships 
“matter” with respect to managerial processes of instrument choice, our analysis has also 
suggested that the extent to which proxy accountability arrangements lead instrument 
choices to diverge from those preferred by beneficiaries varies significantly between cases, 
depending in part on whether the proxies involved are what we called “distant” or 
“solidaristic” proxies. Market-based accountability systems in which consumers act as 
proxy accountability holders were shown to be particularly prone to generating policy 
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instrument choices deviating significantly from those preferred by beneficiaries. The 
consequences of proxy arrangements were also shown to depend importantly on whether 
proxy accountability relationships operate alone, or in a mixed system alongside direct 
beneficiary accountability.  
As noted above, policy instrument choice is likely to be influenced by a variety of 
factors, and further research on a larger number of cases is needed to more fully theorize 
the role of proxy and beneficiary accountability mechanisms in influencing policy choice, 
For instance such research could consider the hypothesis that the presence of beneficiary 
accountability mechanisms in labour-standards NGAs is a sufficient condition, by itself or 
in combination with other conditions, for an emphasis on allocative instruments within a 
complex policy mix.  Such research would need to use techniques that highlight not only 
the causal role of individual conditions but also how they interact in complex 
configurations. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin 2000) may be a 
particularly suitable complement to process tracing, because it can uncover, even for a 
relatively limited number of cases, how various causal conditions interact in producing an 
outcome, and not only their separate contributions. 
Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this paper has suggested that the ability of proxy 
accountability holders to make themselves redundant in the medium and long term by 
aiding the progressive empowerment of beneficiaries is at best contingent on a number of 
factors. This implies that designers of non-state governance arrangements are well advised 
not to rely exclusively on proxy accountability mechanisms, but rather to work actively to 
strengthen the direct involvement and influence of beneficiaries in the management of 
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global non-state governance arrangements.   
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 For a selection of studies that document such cases see Bissel (2001), Dionne et al. 
(2009), Hertel (2006), and Khan et al. (2007). 
2
 See for instance Ronit and Schneider (1999),  nill and Lehmkuhl (2002), O’Rourke 
(2003), Pattberg (2005), Kerwer (2005), Bartley (2007), Stone (2008), Vogel (2008), 
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(2008), Dingwerth (2008), Auld and Gulbrandsen (2010), Fransen (2011), Héritier and 
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4
 In the remainder of the paper, groups that are identified as beneficiaries by the NGAs will 
be referred to simply as ‘beneficiaries’, bracketing the question of whether they actually 
benefit or not. 
5
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6
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7
 We assume that parent preferences are proxies for children preferences. For supportive 
evidence see Bhelotra (2004) (on child labor in Pakistan) and Schluter and Wahba (2010). 
